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The Intelligence gathering activity in Peace Support Operations

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AUTHOR:

Luca Lanubile, Captain, Italian Army

AY 09-10

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr Paolo TRIPODI

Approved: Paolo A. Tripodi

Date: April 21, 2010

Oral Defense Committee Member: LtCol Michael S. Palermo Jr., USMC

Approved: Michael S. Palermo Jr.

Date: 11 MAY 2010

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Executive Summary

Title: The Intelligence gathering activity in Peace Support Operations

Author: Luca Lanubile, Captain, Italian Army

Thesis: Without proper intelligence support, which is mainly provided by human intelligence activity (HUMINT), PSOs might fail. The ethical aspect of the activity is the most plausible and rational explanation of the use of intelligence in PSOs.

Discussion: The United Nations and the international community refuse to admit that the intelligence gathering is necessary for any UN mission. Lebanon 1983 and Rwanda 1994 showed how political decisions have hampered or ignored the value of intelligence assessments with disastrous consequences. The UN primary objection to the use of intelligence in PSOs refers to the necessity of impartiality for any military unit wearing the blue patch of the UN. However, the ethical aspect of intelligence balances its classical military offensiveness, leaving this element free from partiality. In fact, intelligence provides the best way to understand the mission assigned and to protect peacekeepers and population from the threats of the theater. In a PSO environment, intelligence may provide opportunities the reason for de-escalation, acting in advance for the success of the mission and to better protect the population. Therefore, one aspect remains of great importance: the human factor. That is why “HUMINT gathered from interacting with the complete range of local human sources, provides critical information from which a complete intelligence picture can be developed.”¹

Conclusion: Avoid associating intelligence with military activity will provide the UN with an impartial and powerful instrument suitable for the employment in PSOs. In addition, recognizing the protection of the local population as the most valuable advantage gained from intelligence activity in a PSO would provide a reasonable justification to win the resistance of the states.

Preface

In 2006, I was deployed for the sixth time as an officer. However, it was my first deployment wearing a blue beret on a UN mission. Everything in that mission was new. The Area of Operation was new to me, as I had never been in Lebanon before. The environment of the mission was new. At that time, I only had NATO missions experience. The job was different. It was my first billet in an intelligence cell. All these new aspects made me particularly interested in the mission, but the reality of the operation was shocking, frustrating.

The UN Peace Support Operations (PSOs) system works in a very different way than ordinary NATO missions, especially regarding intelligence issues. UN environment greatly exaggerated the already problematic concern about intelligence sharing in a NATO operation. The word *intelligence* was a taboo for the multinational members of the contingent, even though every nation kept a national asset deployed and well functioning. The only reliable form of information for the UN headquarters came from open sources. In a society like the Lebanese, where kids learn the meaning and power of intelligence well before learning to read or to play with dolls, this UN attitude made my job complicated and frustrating.

Learning about Gen. Dallaire's experience in Rwanda validates my thoughts about the inefficiency of the UN system regarding intelligence support to Peace Support Operations. Fortunately, the UNIFIL mission did not have to deal with the massacres of a civil war, at least this time. The inability of the UN to work with the support of intelligence is a false and dangerous standard based mainly on political choices rather than on capabilities or opportunities. The UN has a natural stance in collecting intelligence, thanks to its system of multiple agencies and sub-organizations spread all over crisis areas. The cost for the refusal to exploit information is significant, both in moneys and in mission breakdowns. More

important, it undermines the reputation of the organization itself due to the costs of innocent lives UN has to accept.

The topic of intelligence has been addressed in several publications confirming the importance of such elements, yet no author has ever disconnected the character of intelligence from its military nature, enhancing the ethical aspect of the information. Since the UN justifies its attitude against intelligence with the high moral necessity of neutrality, then no better explanation can be opposed to this refusal than the ethical choice to protect the lives of soldiers and of local population through the exploitation of intelligence.

I wish to thank Dr. Tripodi for the time and patience he spent providing me a different perspective on intelligence. Furthermore, I want to thank the faculty of the USMC CSC, in particular, LtCol Fitzpatrick and LtCol Palermo, Dr Jacobsen and Dr. Johnson for the great year we spent together. Many thanks to Andrea and the staff at Leadership Communication Skills Center for the help and the efforts put into making this study a better product. Finally, I wish to thank my wife for sharing this experience with me.

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Introduction

In any competitive environment, leaders have always tried to foresee the next decision, the likely future action, and what will influence the moves of the counterpart most. The deepest knowledge of the antagonist can be a factor that leads to success. Introducing the core term of this work, David Carment explains that "Intelligence has but one purpose, namely to reduce uncertainty in the mind of decision makers."² Intelligence is a thread that passes through the whole spectrum of circumstances in which the knowledge of the environment is a prelude for success. From the business and financial world to health and education, from government decisions to international systems, from private organizations to popular movements, information is the key to gain advantages to deal with and resolve problems.

In the United Nations (UN) crises response system, the intelligence factor is a controversial issue. On one hand, the need of knowledge of the situation in a crisis area is required to act effectively. On the other, UN members' attitudes toward intelligence hamper the work of UN representatives. The dramatic outcome of the contention is a failure in helping the people in need of UN protection. When the lives of people depend on the clear knowledge of the circumstances in which a crisis developed, then the refusal to exploit intelligence as an advantage becomes an ethical fault.

Yet, often the UN and the international community refuse to admit that the information tool is necessary for any UN mission. According to David Carment "Intelligence is an inappropriate instrument of peace intervention and is counter productive to effectiveness in that it undermines perceptions of impartiality and neutrality."³ In fact, UN member states have always looked at intelligence with a hypocritical attitude: they refuse to acknowledge the deployment of intelligence assets, yet simultaneously exploit the products of those assets.

Considering the UN prejudice towards intelligence a serious shortcoming, this paper will introduce the concept of intelligence in Peace Support Operations (PSOs), demonstrating how information-gathering activities remain essential in an environment that does not necessarily include fighting. This work will demonstrate that without proper intelligence support, mainly represented by human intelligence activity (HUMINT), PSOs might fail.

Furthermore, the study will center the perspective on the ethical aspect of the activity as the most plausible reason for the use of intelligence in PSOs. The separation of intelligence from a rigid military notion will allow a reasonable, broader conception of advantage on the area of operation, and will stress that the population can benefit from a morally and correct use of intelligence.

As a corollary to the ethical conception of intelligence, the lessons learned in Lebanon 1983 and Rwanda 1994 will show how political decisions have hampered or ignored the value of intelligence assessments, with disastrous consequences.

The role of Intelligence

In any relationship involving a confrontation, knowledge of the opponent is not limited to the amount of different information gathered. The comprehension and the awareness of the opponent depend upon information gathered from different sources, linked and analyzed by experienced personnel, and shared with the community. The product of this process is intelligence.

Romans used the word *intellego* to express the process of understanding something. Considering these concepts, *intelligence* has crossed centuries of knowledge requirements becoming the dark side of knowledge, with reference to the predictive aspect of the term. Intelligence tries to solve operative problems by projecting hypothesis on future events and in

several occasions, the difference between a blind challenge and a success has been good intelligence.

A definition of intelligence specifies that:

Information alone does not equate to knowledge or understanding, which are ultimately the product of human cognition and judgment. Intelligence is the analysis and synthesis of information into knowledge. The end result is not more information, but knowledge that gives us a meaningful assessment of the situation.⁴

This definition of intelligence can be applied to any field of analysis or level of interest. Indeed, intelligence itself is an element that does not have a fixed connotation, although its classical reference is to a security and military background. Following an ideal evolution from the Romans' concept, intelligence today is just a single aspect of a more complex human endeavor.

UN PSOs usually deploy troops in crises in support and protection of the local population with the ambitious goal of restoring peace. These missions include every aspect and danger of a classical military operation with one exception: a clearly identifiable enemy. It is important to highlight this peculiarity since the absence of a clear enemy to fight implies a critical consideration. The use of any kind of information in an environment that lacks the classical opposing elements of a conflict is beneficial to the weakest element of that situation. In a UN mission, usually the weakest element is the local population.

Despite the nominal characterization as a military operation, any PSO may depict the role of intelligence as a tool that provides a *neutral* advantage to the population. Since normally such an advantage protects the lives of thousands of people, the role of intelligence in PSOs became an ethical quest for the unit commanders. Moreover, the ethical accent on intelligence eradicates its classical military offensiveness, leaving this element free from any connotation of partiality.

The UN's primary objection to the use of intelligence in PSOs stresses the necessity of impartiality for any military unit wearing the blue insignia of the UN. Such a requirement is a recurring theme in any crisis and the outcomes of poor decisions normally has terrible consequences for the local population with. In the UN common understanding, intelligence in PSOs is only seen as a purely military instrument: namely a way to seek the winning advantage on the enemy.

The closest useful resemblance to a military rationalization of intelligence with its ethical use in PSOs is the concern of the nations about force protection. In fact, MCDP 2 emphasizes a second intelligence objective: "it assists in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence, by helping the commander deny intelligence to the enemy and plan appropriate security measures."⁵ This parallel aspect of intelligence support represents a useful difference in comparison with the exploitation of information in PSOs.

As a matter of fact, the absence of a clear and defined enemy in its conventional sense shifts and amplifies the force protection emphasis on the broader concept of threat, with considerable effects on the information collection activity. "Political decision makers and deployed forces must adapt to ambiguity, with military personnel becoming accustomed to the chaos of operating in the absence of the comfort of a predictable, readily templated enemy force."⁶ Because of the ambiguity, chaos, and absence of comfort, the conventional military understanding of intelligence is widening its horizon in the direction of a more comprehensive approach and information-sharing concept. Thus with this broader vision, intelligence is evolving toward a neutral concept of support in favor of a notion of advantage that also includes government agencies, civilian contractors, companies and international organizations.

The challenge of ethical intelligence

The requirement of a neutral UN force represents the main issue for the contributing

nations of a mission to avoid the uncomfortable topic of intelligence activity. M. Rudner highlighted that in the multinational context of the United Nations, “there are no friendly secret services, only the secret services of friendly states,”⁷ thus confirming, in an indirect way, the requirement and the presence of the intelligence activity in the international organization.

However, this attitude does not consider the ethical aspect of its outcomes. “Intelligence collection does not operate in a moral vacuum; it takes place in a world where governments, particularly western democracies are held to some kind of ethical and moral standard.”⁸ In fact, it is hard to evaluate a topic on the controversial theme of ethical decisions. Additionally, when lives are at stake decisions are even more complicated.

The military profession constantly deals with moral decisions and ethical challenges. Toni Erskine’s claim that, “because intelligence collection is a human endeavor that involves choice and deliberation, it is necessarily vulnerable to ethical scrutiny.”⁹ The responsibility to lead men in battle involves having to face abnormal situations that deserve quickly informed decisions. It is not just a matter of warfighting; even the easiest and safest mission environment may pose serious ethical challenges to the soldiers involved.

PSOs abound with these types of dilemmas. Moreover, the intelligence variable raises the complexity of the decisions to a higher level. “As the emphasis shifts from traditional observation missions to enforcement operations for humanitarian purposes, the ethical implications of *failing to use* intelligence become more than an issue.”¹⁰ The threshold that separates a sound evaluation not to use intelligence in peacekeeping missions for neutrality reasons, from a disastrous decision that weighs on the life of innocent civilians, may be vague and often underestimated.

One possible danger in a mission is its escalation: an aspect that deserves the same attention in PSOs. In fact, the risk of the so-called “mission creeping”¹¹ is always present

with a more diffused and uncertain threat. "Peacekeepers are liable to find themselves in countries in which no government is in undisputed control, order is in the point of collapse, and the use of force against UN personnel is a distinct possibility."¹² The deployment of UN Forces then ought to be carried out with the maximum amount of force protection, and intelligence is one of the greatest providers of safety for the force.

For this reason, nations deploy contingents that are fully armed and equipped to face emergencies, even when the operation is just to provide humanitarian aid. However, in a PSO environment, intelligence may be a key element for de-escalation, acting in advance for the success of the mission and for the life of the population.

Since force protection of the personnel deployed in PSOs is a main concern for nation contributors, intelligence plays an enhanced role in the safety of the personnel. "Member states have come to the conclusion that the nature of conflict has changed and threats to missions have changed. Force protection is now the main factor when approving the gathering of military information."¹³ Hence, it is considered ethically justifiable for nations to skip common customs in the use of intelligence in PSOs in order to protect their own troops.

As J.M. Jones pointed out:

This moral accounting makes it possible to consider the overall benefit gained from intelligence collection (in promoting security and international stability for example) to outweigh the morally questionable methods used to obtain it. Interestingly, these benefits can foster either national or international goals. For example, particular intelligence collection methods could get the green light if their ends promoted the idealist goal of international peace or a realist concern for fewer casualties on side.¹⁴

A reasonable further step ahead would be to include the security of the local population amongst the reasons to promote the use of intelligence. However, under the public opinion's view "a level of a risk, which is perceived as acceptable in cases where defense of the homeland is involved, will not necessarily be acceptable in the context of providing

security to societies other than one's own."¹⁵ This consideration represents a serious reflection on the ethical use of intelligence in favor of the population of the host country.

In this context, intelligence is the best way to understand the mission assigned and to protect peacekeepers and population from the threats of the theater. A proper use of intelligence has a direct benefit on the local population. In fact, if ethics deals with critical decisions such the life or death of individuals, there should be no difference between the lives of a nation's own troops and the lives of those whom troops are committed for.

As Carment rightly noted, "Force protection and the security of civilian populations is perhaps the strongest ethical argument for the use of intelligence."¹⁶ Massacres of thousands of innocent civilians are therefore rational motivations to exploit intelligence-gathering activity even in a PSO environment. P. Välimäki highlighted that, "to gain strategic advantage in order to avoid war and bloodshed, nations require accurate information and insight."¹⁷ Therefore, when intelligence products provide effective means to prevent casualties amongst civilians, it would be a harsh ethical misconduct to ignore such information only in the name of neutrality.

The UN reasons against Intelligence

As a consequence of World War II effects, the UN mirrors the expectations and the fears of all the nation members. States have always been unwilling to submit their sovereignty to the decision of an organization that includes allies and enemies. This is particularly true in the sensitive field of intelligence. In fact, to recognize power of an international organization like the UN was a revolution in the concept of state sovereignty.

For this reason, W. Dorn explains that:

Many states have been reluctant to give the UN a greater intelligence mandate because to many of them, intelligence is power and they felt that their own power would be threatened by a more vigilant UN that possessed real intelligence, especially intelligence they may themselves not have.¹⁸

The failure of several PSOs highlighted a serious lack of interest to intelligence support as a result of states' policies regarding the intelligence activity during UN missions. According to several authors, "there are many failures in the history of UN field operations that might have been avoided if the UN had taken a more forthright approach to intelligence."¹⁹ The Rwanda genocide is one of the clearest and bloodiest examples²⁰.

The advantages in terms of diplomatic solutions of the crises, deriving from being a member of the UN, are thus balanced by the mutual lack of trust of the States. This behavior hampers the already fragile efficiency of the most important international organization in relation with PSOs. Without the UN, peacekeeping would be a debatable concept in the hands of those nations capable of interventions and might always be subject to neocolonialism critics. Thanks to the consent of the member states, these missions provide a response *super partes* to crises.

The end of the Cold War was the end of a longtime clash that was aimed at knowing what was happening beyond both sides of the *iron curtain*. "With the end of the Cold War, an ironic situation developed in the intelligence field. The UN moved to center stage in world affairs, with mission of greater scope and authority, and its need for accurate and timely intelligence increased proportionately."²¹ Without an enemy to face on the other side of the ocean the threat spread out to the remains of the old system, shifting information gathering from a "spy job" to a more complex activity aimed to fulfill several requisites in different crises environments.

Being armed when facing an enemy requires intelligence to know when, where and who will attack. Being unarmed facing many possible threats requires intelligence to know why they will attack. The likely enemy to fight is no longer the soldier wearing another uniform. The terrain to analyze is not just the battlefield on which the armies clash. The population is not always the passive character that suffers the conflict.

Although this is common understanding, the nations retain hypocritical doubts on the use of intelligence in PSOs. It seems that “the term ‘United Nations Intelligence’ is an oxymoron. Not that the UN is *Un-intelligent*; it should only use information from direct observation and open (overt) sources.”²² The reality on the ground is slightly different since open sources do not provide reliable information and the direct observation of an event contrasts with the inherited predictive nature of intelligence.

Despite the public denial of the use of intelligence assets, these precious units are widely deployed in all UN missions, hidden by acronyms that do not indicate any link with intelligence. Therefore, an uncomfortable issue nations have to face is to justify an activity that is always on the edge of legality. Although intelligence activity in PSOs is usually carried out in national uniform, through overt actions and mainly with legal means, there are always concerns amongst nations about this delicate activity.

As J.M. Jones highlighted:

These perspectives are rigid and attempt to identify black and white answers to moral questions. Clearly, this is not helpful in a discipline that often crosses into shades of grey; therefore, ethical models need to take into account the necessity for flexibility and moral reasoning to create a practical model for an intelligence community that will remain effective, while also abiding by the moral standards of the society it serves.²³

The UN does not admit the intelligence amongst the instruments of a PSO. However, the UN has not yet provided any ethical justification for these refusals. Taken apart from a strict military function of a targeting instrument, intelligence is the answers to those uncomfortable refusals, finally finding a role in the PSOs.

Intelligence in Peace Support Operations

As previously mentioned, UN PSOs are military operations, planned and executed with the same procedures that rule conventional conflicts. Both conflicts and PSOs make use of rules of engagement (RoE) to limit and to justify the use of force. In addition to the RoE,

each country provides national political limitations (*caveats*) to the mission, establishing practical limits to the conduct of the operations of the contingent.

Since the beginning of the UN PSOs, there has been a tacit and widely approved *caveat*: no intelligence activity for the “blue-helmet” soldiers. Van Kappen mentioned that “there has always been a tradition within the UN system that intelligence gathering is contrary to the open nature of the UN system itself and is therefore absolutely forbidden,”²⁴ yet the correct accomplishment of the mission requires all the fundamental elements of a military mission including intelligence.

David Carment is even more accurate when he points out that “from force generation down to the utilization of a section on the ground in a UN peacekeeping mission, you need information – accurate, timely information – specifically, the analyzed product that we call intelligence.”²⁵ Even more interesting is the fact that intelligence in PSOs requires peculiar aspects that elevate this element to a higher and more accurate capability for the peacekeepers.

Carment continues defining Peacekeeping Intelligence (PKI) as:

A new form of intelligence that brings together predominantly open sources of information, or open-sources intelligence (OSINT), and synthesizes it with human and technical sources to create a holistic perspective at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels, while emphasizing a wide sharing of information.²⁶

Unfortunately, Carment’s description of PKI tends to remain a remarkable definition rather than an actual representation of the reality in the UN environment. In fact, the three levels mentioned in the definition are still far away from being effectively supported with the use of intelligence. In war, the three levels of intelligence activity, strategic, operational, and tactical, focus their efforts toward the respective centers of gravity of the enemy, in order to strike him in the most efficient way. Only at the tactical level is intelligence aimed to discover the position of the enemy and the strengths and weakness of its defense.

Conversely, the use of PKI might merge the three levels of information to guarantee the right knowledge of the events and prevent the loss of innocent lives. The lack of any of the three levels of information is a hazard to the success of the mission and to the security of the personnel. Moreover, the use of intelligence in PSOs may shift the Center of Gravity toward the local population as first priority and to the friendly forces.

Even though “the UN system has potentially an inherent and considerable capability to collect information and therefore intelligence”²⁷, what hampers the correct use of information in PSOs is the national approach to the topic which concerns states with their own security. The actions of these nations usually prevent the sharing of information and tend to leave the word intelligence out from the Peacekeeping context.

Human intelligence. The tactical response to UN strategic intelligence.

The United Nations acknowledgment of intelligence in PSOs represents a great improvement toward the success of the missions. However, this recent evolution in the operational culture of the organization is still incomplete. Since the main UN players are nations, the organization tried to solve the gap of strategic intelligence while still pretending to forget the operational and tactical level of the problem. Basically, UN soldiers still face the same kind of intelligence gaps at operational and tactical levels, while governments are fully aware of the strategic situation. “Strategic intelligence is obviously required to understand the political situation between the parties to a conflict prior to UN involvement and to anticipate the political moves of factions, especially if there is a risk of violence.”²⁸ The consent on the importance of the strategic intelligence is thus widely accepted amidst those countries participating in PSOs. However the international community still refuses a dialogue on the cooperation for the operational and the tactical level of intelligence.

At the UNHQ in New York, the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (SAS) was formed as a separate section within the situation center of the Department of Political Affairs. "Intelligence experts from the five permanent members of the Security Council man this section. These experts have access throughout their national channels to the intelligence agencies of their respective nations."²⁹ Since only personnel from the five permanent members of the Security Council *share* information in this section, it may be just another instrument of control and balance of power rather than an effective means of Force Protection for the deployed troops.

The UN response to the deployed troops' need for intelligence was thus the creation of the SAS. Despite the efforts that led to the SAS resulted in a great improvement for the UN, the troops on the ground were not able to appreciate the support and the products of this office. The UN has not learned yet the lessons from several missions' failures due to the lacking of operational or tactical intelligence.

Governments exploit the analysis of the strategic intelligence while the Commanders on the ground need assessments at a tactical and/or operational level to preserve the lives of their soldiers. Satellites and high-technology communication assets can be useful against enemies that use a similar kind of equipment. Yet, most of the PSOs operate in poor scenarios where the parts in conflict use poor weapons to annihilate the enemy. As D. Carment noted, "common indicators and warnings, with which the modern intelligence system is comfortable, are inadequate when the cause is ethnic hatred and the weapon system of choice is a machete."³⁰

In this context, one element is of great importance: the human factor. In fact, "open sources are of greatest value at the strategic level, particularly during pre-deployment planning and training, while human sources have their greatest utility at the tactical level."³¹ No technological tool can replace the eyes and ears of soldiers trained and deployed

specifically to be in contact with the local population in order to gather information. P. Cammaert rightly commented that “HUMINT is the major contributor to understand the population, local attitudes, emotions, opinions, identities and importance of key players, its culture and needs and how these relate to the operational environment.”³²

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the oldest branch of the intelligence gathering activity. It is the cheapest to deploy, but the slowest to provide results, yet the intelligence acquired from HUMINT sources is often the most valuable. The involvement of HUMINT operators within the local population is the main issue that keeps UN doubtful on the value of this activity; in fact, “because HUMINT is the collection of information by humans, it is often equated with ‘spying’.”³³ HUMINT operators avoid the dangerous and misleading definition of spy by simply carrying on their activity without any deep secrecy policy. HUMINT operators wear their own country’s uniforms, which differentiates a HUMINT operator from a spy. Moreover, Force Protection of the personnel is the main goal of HUMINT operators, while Secret Services and spies aim at much higher and strategic information.

Intelligence in a war environment enhances the use of high technology assets such as satellite (IMINT) and radio interception (SIGINT). Despite the great accuracy of these means, the information gathered cannot provide the core of the valuable information for a PSO environment: emotions, opinions, and attitude of the local population. During warfighting, IMINT and SIGINT can provide the correct location of a target and guide a successful strike. In PSOs, no technological sensor can provide the mood of a starving population or the attitude of entire villages scared by local militias. Therefore, “HUMINT gathered from interacting with the complete range of local human sources, provides critical information from which a complete intelligence picture can be developed.”³⁴

The use of HUMINT assets still remains a national issue. Officially, no intelligence assets, especially HUMINT, are deployed in UN missions. However those contingents that can rely on the hidden support of HUMINT national operators, have great advantages on understanding the whole mission and on the security of their soldiers.

Lessons Learned

UN Peacekeeping history is a controversial mix of success and failure. Every peacekeeping deployment is a response of the international community to a different crisis. The consequences of a failure in those already dammed places are catastrophic.

The reasons for the failures are different but the lack of intelligence is a common missing element that often became the main cause of mission breakdowns. This evident constraint was the cause of failure in several UN missions. As P. Eriksson pointed out, “the experiences of UN operations reveal in many cases that both commanders and soldiers possess flawed or insufficient information on the situation they face on duty.”³⁵ Avoiding the blindness of the troops by sharing good intelligence is an excellent way to prevent bloodshed.

The following lessons learned provide clear examples of the consequences of lack of intelligence in two different PSOs (Rwanda under UN mandate and Lebanon under a multinational force), and how the outcomes resulted in high civilian casualties. The Rwanda massacre outlines the ethical aspect of the intelligence issue in PSO while the Lebanese attack to the USMC barracks represents a tragic failure in the Force Protection subject.

Rwanda

*We have carefully reviewed the situation in the light of your MIR-79. We cannot agree to the operation contemplated in paragraph 7 of your cable, as it clearly goes beyond the mandate entrusted to UNAMIR under resolution 872 (1993)*³⁶

As reported by W. Dorn and D. Charters:

In December 1993, at least five months before the massacres began the UN force Commander Canadian General Romeo Dallaire received ‘strategic

warning' of the genocide plan from a well informed confidential source who provided details of the plan and the locations of weapons caches.³⁷

The several desperate attempts made by Gen. Dallaire to warn UN headquarters in New York were ignored by the hesitant and unprepared organization. The UN Security Council was convinced that the conflict was chaotic and based on longstanding hatreds, an evident lack of basic intelligence that prevented the Council from distinguishing genocide from an internal tribal struggle. The UN refusal to exploit the available information was the end for both the intelligence support to the Rwanda mission and to the mission itself.

The genocide that followed was partly also the consequence of the regrettable UN behavior. The atrocities of the Hutu appeared to be even worse, considering the excellent but unexploited intelligence in Gen. Dallaire's hands. This tactical information could have had a significant impact on the whole mission. In fact, Gen. Dallaire's "blue helmets" were ready to intervene and seize the weapons caches (mostly machetes), hampering the genocide and uncovered the real intentions of Hutu leaders. The UN decision to ignore such threatening warnings was worse than a complete lack of intelligence support and was carelessly taken "to its own detriment and disgrace, and to the unimaginable suffering of the Rwandese people."³⁸

The inquiry that followed the catastrophic failure of the mission highlighted the absence of a strong UN mandate. However, the ignored intelligence would have compensated even for a weak mandate. Moreover, "had there been a more detailed intelligence assessment considering historical tendencies, the political will and military capability of the belligerents,"³⁹ the whole mission would have been calibrated differently. In fact, "General Dallaire argued that UN primary intelligence requirement was for operational intelligence which was absolutely essential to the force commander in order to enable him to fulfill his mandate."⁴⁰ Entrapped between the refusal to rely on intelligence gathered through human sources and the absence of further information from higher command, Gen. Dallaire was powerless, without the means or the mandate to prevent the genocide.

As Gen. Dallaire described in his book:

Since leaving Kigali in August, I had had no means of intelligence on Rwanda. Not one country was willing to provide the UN or even me personally with accurate and up to date information. One of the restrictions on a chapter six mission is that it can't run its own intelligence gathering; in the spirit of openness and transparency, it has to be totally dependent on the goodwill of opposing sides to inform the mission command of problems and threats. Our lack of intelligence and basic operational information, and the reluctance of any nation to provide us with it, helped form my first suspicion that I might find myself out on a limb if I ever needed help in the field.⁴¹

Rwanda represents a perfect, although tragic, example that justifies the use of intelligence in a PSO. The lives of almost one million people killed in the genocide were worthy of the breaking of the untold rule of "no intelligence" in the UN. Moreover, the choice of UN Headquarters not to consider the information provided to the Blue Helmets resulted in an absence of partiality even more serious than the use of the information itself. The Hutu, in particular, had the chance to implement the genocide in the absence of a UN force capable to stop it. The ethical side of the dramatic event is also represented by the desperate withdrawal of the UN Force. In fact, following the murder of ten Belgian soldiers, the UN Force was reduced from 2,500 to 270 units, highlighting a disparity between the Force protection and the protection of the Rwandan population, between the life of soldier and the life of a civilian. The blameless organization of the UN had to comply with this huge ethical dilemma, which resulted in bloodshed.

In 1995, soon after the genocide, the UN deployed another mission in Rwanda, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR II). As a tragic confirmation of the mistakes of the previous mission, the staff of the UNAMIR II incorporated six intelligence officers who made extensive use of open source intelligence. The intelligence cell represented a late acknowledgment to the efforts made by the Gen. Dallaire though useless to the hundreds of thousands of dead of the genocide.

Lebanon

In their work on peacekeeping intelligence R.D. Steel, B. De Jong and W. Platje described the disastrous attack on Marine Barracks in Beirut 1983 as follows:

At 6:22 a.m. on the morning of October 22, 1983, a Shiite suicide bomber detonated a massive car bomb outside the US Marine Barracks in Beirut, killing 241 American servicemen. The inattention to intelligence of the US Marines Corps commander in Beirut in 1983 is a stark example of what can go horribly wrong if peacekeeping commanders do not pay attention to the information that their intelligence staffs provide.⁴²

The Multinational Force in Beirut was the world's response to the Lebanese Civil War, a struggle that occurred in a region already affected by the presence of Palestine Liberation Organization on its soil, which eventually led to the Israeli occupation of the country in 1982. The assassination of Lebanese president, Bashir Gemayel, and the massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila led to the deployment of US Marines, French paratroopers, Italian and British forces in Beirut for a peacekeeping mission.

The Lebanese theater of operations was a difficult environment with regard to the security of the forces and the force protection. Years of struggles, in the heart of Middle East region, had transformed Lebanon into a Babel of spies and terrorist organizations from all the major actors of the area: Iran, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine. The peacekeeping force that was deployed into this chaos was not ready to confront the intelligence challenge.

The MNF had a very poor basic intelligence of Lebanese reality. In fact, "the disastrous bombing of US Marines is largely attributable to a lack of understanding of the nature of the threat. US forces had little knowledge of how various Lebanese and PLO factions were likely to respond as the US escalated military actions."⁴³ Several months passed before the MNF was able to discriminate the real threats from fake warnings.

The car bombings at the US and French Barracks came unexpectedly. They revealed the deep lack of knowledge of the operational environment. The US commission that

investigated the attack pointed out how the US intelligence machine failed in providing the Commander with timely and effective intelligence:

The commission concludes that although the USMNF commander received a large volume of intelligence warnings concerning potential terrorist threats prior to 23 October 1983, he was not provided with the timely intelligence tailored to his specific operational needs that was necessary to defend against the broad spectrum of threats he faced. The commission further concludes that the HUMINT support to the USMNF commander was ineffective, being neither precise nor tailored to these needs.⁴⁴

The commission's judgment on the HUMINT support confirms the importance of these assets even in a peacekeeping mission environment. The Italian contingent reached the same conclusions, but the efficiency of Italian HUMINT operators provided different assessments and support. McDermott and K. Skjelsbaek described the Italian contingent work on the intelligence aspect:

To identify the threat, to understand its probable configuration, and to predict possible targets, the Italian contingent had to forge links between intelligence levels. This was a possible thanks to skilled staff, which had considerable knowledge of the environmental conditions and of the political leanings of the leaders of the different communities of the area. Having established, in principle, the advantage of merging the peacekeeping force into the social environment, it was important to acquaint and update the soldiers on the cultural, religious, social, political, and economic situation on Lebanon.⁴⁵

As a consequence of the two attacks at the US and French barracks, Italian engineers reinforced the defensive belt surrounding their headquarters. Moreover, stricter force protection measures were enforced. As remembered by F. Isman reporting an interview with General Angioni, Italian Force Commander:

After the bombing, the new US Force Commander, Gen. Jim Joy visited the Italian headquarters to acknowledge the safety and security measures of the Italian contingent and to use them as a model. Also a US Senate Commission from Washington asked Italian Commander his opinion on the bombing and on the possible measures that could have been taken to prevent it.⁴⁶

The Italian headquarter was aware that the only target left was the Italian contingent; the next car bomb would have hit an Italian objective. On February 20th, 1984 the Italian Force withdrew from Beirut. No car bomb attack was made on an Italian target.

The Multinational Force had underestimated the real threats in Lebanon due to the lack of basic intelligence. The lack of proper, timely, and current intelligence kept the situation unclear, often unknown. "On September 27, 1983, NSA sent out a warning message to the White House and the CIA station in Beirut and Damascus which indicated that, on the basis of an intercepted telephone conversation, a terrorist group intended to undertake an extraordinary operation against the Marines in Beirut."⁴⁷ Just like the many other warnings previously issued, the lack of a good network of sources on the ground did not allow US HUMINT operators to confirm the information.

Once again, technological support cannot provide effective intelligence by itself. Only multiple sources can grant an intelligence picture close to reality and often only human sources can provide the missing critical confirmation. That is why, as suggested by the Beirut Commission:

The collection and analysis of intelligence about terrorism can and should be improved in order to better anticipate terrorist attacks, accurately assign culpability for those attacks, and develop appropriate countermeasures and responses. It takes years to develop this kind of intelligence. Meanwhile, in situations like that in Lebanon, it may be useful to consider augmenting US forces with area experts.⁴⁸

The intelligence failure of the MNF led to a failure of the operation, at least for two of the main forces deployed. Despite US superior firepower and the excellent technology, the human factor of the war influenced a peacekeeping mission as well. Therefore, the consequences of the underestimation of intelligence resulted in casualties.

Conclusion

UN policy on the use of intelligence in PSOs remains a topic mostly dependent on political choices rather than on military considerations. In fact, "the use of force is regarded as a necessary and appropriate tool of peace interventions, but no such consensus has been reached with respect to intelligence."⁴⁹ The interests of the nations usually prevail on the

success of a peacekeeping mission or on the lives of the soldiers deployed or even on the population of the host nation.

This work presented the intelligence factor as a separate element from the rigid military perspective. Avoid associating intelligence with military activity will provide the UN with an impartial and powerful instrument suitable for the employment in PSOs. Moreover, recognizing that the only valuable advantage gained from intelligence activity in a PSO is the protection of the life of the local population is a reasonable justification to win the diffidence of the states. It could be effective to combine ethical aspects and operational needs.

Those who are in charge to decide the deployment of a mission should realize that the success of the mission and the life of peacekeepers, as well as the life of the local population, depend on the knowledge of any possible aspect of the host nation, and on the good perception of the current situation. Moreover, “none of this need violate neutrality, impartiality, or political sensitivity. For the most part it would simply be the rationalization of the information that the UN is already collecting in any case.”⁵⁰ To refuse the support of information analysis in a PSO is the worst way to pursue a peaceful cooperation amongst the nations and a risky game that put the lives of people at stake. “If the UN seeks to take on military engagements, they must be backed by appropriate intelligence. The UN must be given the means, including information gathering and analysis, to manifest its goal, as stated in the opening words of the UN Charter, of ‘saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’”⁵¹ For the organization that has the word “peace” engraved in its statute, to decline intelligence support is an ethical failure.

Endnotes

- ¹ Canadian Army Lessons Learned Center, *Dispatches*, vol.8 n.1, June 2001, p. 1
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- ³ A. Gendron, *The ethics of Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations*, in D. Carment, 162.
- ⁴ MCDP 2 "Intelligence", 20.
- ⁵ MCDP 2 "Intelligence", 6.
- ⁶ R. Martyn, in D. Carment, 19.
- ⁷ M. Rudner, *Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism*, in J. Morgan Jones, *Is ethical intelligence a contradiction in terms?*, University of Aberystwyth, 2007, available at <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=364>
- ⁸ J. M. Jones, *Is ethical intelligence a contradiction in terms?*, University of Aberystwyth, 2007, available at <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=364>
- ⁹ T. Erskine, *As Rays of Light to the Human Soul. Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering*, in J. Morgan Jones, *Is ethical intelligence a contradiction in terms?*, University of Aberystwyth, 2007, available at <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=364>
- ¹⁰ A. Gendron, in D. Carment, 159.
- ¹¹ The term *mission creeping* describes the expansion of a mission from its initial goals usually toward a more dangerous and violent struggle.
- ¹² H. Smith in R.D.Steele, B. de Jong, W. Platje, *Peacekeeping Intelligence, Emerging concepts for the future*, OSS International Press, Oakton, Virginia, 2003, 230.
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- ¹⁴ J. M. Jones, *Is ethical intelligence a contradiction in terms?*, University of Aberystwyth, 2007, available at <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=364>
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- ¹⁹ W. Dorn, 1.
- ²⁰ R. Dallaire, "Shake hands with the devil", Da Capo Press, Philadelphia, 2005
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- ²² W. Dorn, *Intelligence at United Nations headquarters?*, in D. Carment, 67.
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- ²⁵ D. Carment, xx.
- ²⁶ D. Carment, I.
- ²⁷ F. Van Kappen in R.D.Steele, 9.
- ²⁸ H. Smith, in R.D.Steele, 231.
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- ³¹ W. Dorn, 61.
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- ³⁴ Canadian Army Lessons Learned Center, *Dispatches*, vol.8 n.1, June 2001, p. 1
- ³⁵ P. Eriksson, N.M. Rekkedal, E. Strommen, *Intelligence in Peace Support Operations*. Norwegian Defence Research Establishments, Stockholm, 1996
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- ³⁸ W. Dorn, 23.
- ³⁹ D. Carment, xx.
- ⁴⁰ P. Johnston in R.D.Steele, 326.
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- ⁴⁶ F. Isman, *Angioni, noi a Beirut*, Adnkronos libri, Rizzoli, Roma, 1984, 16.
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